The year 2024 ended with heightened tensions in India’s neighbourhood. On Christmas, Pakistani airstrikes targeted seven locations in Afghanistan, killing 46 people including women and children. This was in retaliation to a 21 December attack by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in South Waziristan, which killed 16 Pakistani security personnel. In retaliation, the Taliban struck several points in Pakistan. The cycle escalated further on 29 December, when an explosion at the Taliban’s Ministry of Interiorn killed 10 personnel. It was claimed by the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan, which aligns with Pakistan.
Meanwhile, Baloch insurgents, siding with the Taliban in their fight for self-determination, added another layer to the chaos. Earlier in March, militants bombed and attacked Pakistani forces at a border post, prompting airstrikes that, according to the Taliban, killed civilians.
In the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, these tensions are exacerbated by jihadi doctrines rooted in Sharia, often exploited by state actors to destabilise rivals. Pakistan’s use of such groups against India has boomeranged, with the country now facing the destructive forces it once fostered. This volatile dynamic underscores the enduring instability in South Asia, where historical wounds continue to fester.
The Durand Line, or the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, was drawn during colonial rule and has remained a contentious issue since Pakistan’s formation in 1947. The border divides the countries’ Pashtun population, and has never been formally recognised by any Afghan government. The long-standing grievance this division created has never been acknowledged – neither by the Taliban of the 1990s nor the Taliban 2.0 government that emerged in 2021. Historically, Pakistan allied with the Afghan Taliban to suppress Pashtun nationalism, leveraging the Haqqani Network, a potent Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)-backed Taliban faction.
However, following the Taliban’s return in 2021, the geopolitical landscape shifted. The rise of the TTP in 2007 introduced a new threat. Initially a Taliban offshoot, the TTP pursued three goals: undermining Pakistan’s control over Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, imposing Sharia law across Pakistan, and opposing coalition forces in Afghanistan. Though banned by Pakistan, the TTP persisted, supported by the Taliban and al-Qaeda despite official denials of involvement.
Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have deteriorated since 2021. In 2023, the TTP established a new base in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, training suicide bombers and rebranding under fronts such as the Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan, granting plausible deniability. The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the Majeed Brigade have joined forces with the TTP, deepening regional instability. The Majeed Brigade, pivotal in the Baloch insurgency, highlights the interconnected nature of these militant groups.
For Pakistan, a state already grappling with internal challenges, these developments expose the limitations of its hollowed-out institutions. Decades of fostering militancy to achieve strategic goals have backfired, as the country now contends with the chaotic outcomes of its policies—a stark reminder of the axiom, “You reap what you sow.”
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As the United States ended its two-decade intervention in Afghanistan, the shift in global dynamics saw China’s influence rise, intensifying its rivalry with the US in the Indo-Pacific region especially.
Meanwhile, on the continental front, China has been arming Pakistan and Bangladesh, with reports suggesting the planned delivery of 40 J-35 fifth-generation stealth fighters to Pakistan within two years. While some of this may be propaganda, China’s intent to strengthen its foothold in India’s neighbourhood is undeniable.
China under Xi Jinping is aggressively pushing for a unipolar Asia. And it’s doing it through weapon deals, acquiring strategic ports in the ‘String of Pearls,’ and advancing Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in nearly all of India’s neighboring countries except Bhutan.
In Afghanistan, China’s cautious stance toward the Taliban is primarily driven by security concerns. It aims to suppress the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) and East Turkestan groups that threaten Xinjiang, whose distinct Muslim identity Beijing seeks to erase.
Russia, also vulnerable to terrorist threats from such groups, has taken a proactive role in Taliban-led Afghanistan. Following the Taliban’s 2021 takeover, Russia quickly established diplomatic ties with the country, with Ambassador Dmitry Zhirnov openly engaging Taliban and declaring that there was “no alternative” to it. This partnership reflects Russia’s historical interests in Afghanistan and aligns with its shared anti-West stance with China.
The Russia-Taliban closeness underscores a shared resistance to Western influence, with Beijing often fuelling such situations to advance its own global designs.
Also read:Why Pakistan accuses Taliban of doing what it has been doing to India — abetting terrorism
The Taliban’s arsenal largely comprises rudimentary weapons and abandoned US stockpiles from 2021. Comparatively, Pakistan’s military strength far surpasses that of the Taliban. However, continued bombing of TTP targets is not in Pakistan’s long-term interest, as it exacerbates Pashtun alienation.
Additionally, Pakistan hosts millions of Afghan refugees and controls Afghanistan’s trade flows via the Karachi port.
This trade leverage, however, could weaken if Afghanistan diversifies its trade routes to Iran’s Bandar Abbas and Chabahar ports, part of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). This corridor aims to connect India, Russia, Iran, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Yet, INSTC faces hurdles, including sanctions on Russia and Iran and its heavy reliance on a road-based trade route. India, too, has promoted Chabahar as an alternative by a tripartitie arrangement between India-Afghanistan and Iran. But whether it can replace Karachi remains uncertain. A shift in trade routes would significantly diminish Pakistan’s influence over Afghanistan.
The human cost of this geopolitical struggle is tragic. Artificially drawn borders have divided people, fueling a cycle of violence over overlapping claims, identities, and aspirations for self-determination misguided by religious fanaticism.
The Taliban’s second regime has dashed Pakistan’s aspirations for greater strategic depth in Afghanistan. Contrary to Islamabad’s expectations, the Taliban has neither condemned India’s abrogation of Article 370—a critical pillar of Pakistan’s theatrics on Kashmir—nor acted against the TTP, whose attacks on the Pakistani military have intensified since 2021.
While the Durand Line remains central to the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict, today’s security challenges transcend borders. The region is ensnared in a web of extremist ideologies, tribal loyalties, and institutional decay, undermining governance and rule of law.
Regional bodies such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) offer little respite. India faces a precarious task of securing itself from a fractured Pakistan – home to uncontrolled Jihadi groupings of varying degrees – an increasingly radicalised Bangladesh, and the refugee crisis on its porous borders. Meanwhile, Beijing exploits this instability to push for a unipolar Asia under the Communist Party of China’s leadership, contrasting India’s vision of a multipolar world.
Concrete strategies and actionable solutions, not mere condemnations, are essential for navigating these challenges. India must re-imagine its defence capabilities and act well in time.
Swasti Rao is a Consulting editor, ThePrint and foreign policy expert. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.
(Edited by Zoya Bhatti)
