Even before America’s election, the world was unstable, with wars raging in Ukraine and the Middle East, among other places, and crackling tensions in the Pacific. The next ten weeks could bring new perils. Donald Trump wants to upend American foreign policy, but won’t take office until January 20th. The authority of Joe Biden’s lame-duck administration is shrivelling. That creates a period of limbo, which America’s enemies could exploit, breaking rules and escalating conflicts to lock in gains. Despite their differences, Mr Biden’s and Mr Trump’s teams must work together to deter them.
Mr Trump’s early appointments suggest his foreign policy will indeed be radical. Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz, his picks for secretary of state and national security adviser, may sound like old-school conservatives, hawkish on China and Iran. But they are where they are because they have adopted Trumpian positions: vocal loyalty to the leader, impatience with NATO and the war in Ukraine. The new trade tsar may be Robert Lighthizer, an arch-protectionist itching to wage a new tariff war. The Pentagon will be run by a novice keen to blow up the deep state. Mr Trump appears hungry to strike deals and take unconventional advice. His staff have not yet signed up to rules on using secure communications, and are ignoring the norm that an incoming administration refrains from foreign dealings until it is in office. On November 8th he called Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, with Elon Musk on the line.
Faced with this, countries have an incentive to create facts on the ground, fast, that will put them in a favourable position in January. Some of those facts are welcome: free-loading American allies are suddenly boosting defence spending, for example. Others may be disruptive. Vladimir Putin may escalate his offensive to try to grab more Ukrainian territory before any peace talks begin. Israel may hammer Gaza, Lebanon and beyond, hoping that the new administration will let it “finish the job” in Iran and agree to lopsided ceasefires. China may probe to see how much it can bully Taiwan or the Philippines without provoking a serious reaction; tensions in the South China Sea are rising.
The Biden and Trump administrations detest each other, but they have a common interest in deterring such things. It may be a thankless task, but Mr Biden’s team has a duty to use its remaining influence, which stems mainly from military support to allies, to prevent lame-duck bedlam. If Mr Trump thinks a shambolic end to the Biden presidency would help him shine by comparison, he should think again. If he arrives in the Oval Office with a rout in Ukraine, an inferno in the Middle East and Chinese ships running amok, his job will be that much harder.
Both teams should therefore agree and articulate a common framework for the lame-duck period. To keep the rapacious Mr Putin at bay, America should send more weapons to Ukraine and ease restrictions on its use of long-range missiles. In the Middle East, both teams should make clear to Israel that a unilateral attack on Iran’s nuclear sites in the coming weeks will not receive American military support, which it would probably require to succeed. In the South China Sea, China needs to hear that America’s position on maritime rights has not wavered. Future historians may describe the next ten weeks as the moment when America shifted from its post-1945 internationalism to a new and more isolationist foreign policy. But if Team Biden and Team Trump act wisely, the lame-duck period need not bring global mayhem.
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