White House core security team packed with China hawks

Washington: Ivan Kanapathy, a former national security official with deep expertise on Taiwan who believes that US should invest in stronger deterrence, is likely to be the top China hand in President Donald Trump’s National Security Council, multiple people familiar with the development said.

In Trump’s first term, Kanapathy served as the director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia and the deputy senior director for Asian Affairs in the NSC. Between 2014 and 2017, he worked at the American Institute in Taiwan, advising Taipei on military and security affairs.

A naval flight officer deployed to the Western Pacific and West Asia, a Mandarin speaker, a graduate of East Asian security studies, and a former Marine Corps Fellow who helped develop the service’s global security strategy, Kanapathy is well-respected in DC’s strategic community. He is currently a senior vice president with Beacon Global Strategies, a strategic advisory firm.

If confirmed, Kanapathy’s appointment will make the core of Trump’s NSC a hub of China sceptics who remain deeply concerned about its intentions, alarmed at its capabilities, conscious of what they see as its growing coercive behaviour, and committed to a competitive approach. The team is broadly invested in the Indo-Pacific strategy – including deepening ties with allies and partners – that was adopted by Trump in his first term and sustained by Joe Biden.

Trump has appointed House representative Michael Waltz as his national security advisor, and Alex Wong as principal deputy NSA — both have strong and critical views on China.

HT reported on Saturday that David Feith, who played a role in crafting the Indo-Pacific strategy in Trump’s first term in the State Department and has been vocal about tech-national security linkages regarding China, will take over as senior director for tech and national security. Ricky Gill will be the top South Asia hand. Kanapathy is likely to be Feith and Gill’s counterpart on the China file.

While he will be just one voice in Trump’s China policy, albeit a significant one, Kanapathy’s recent views offer insights into the possible policy direction. They signal a mix of continuity from Trump’s first term and Biden’s approach, but with a more aggressive thrust towards China, stronger backing for Taiwan including a shift in policy framing, and higher expectations of burden-sharing from allies.

Trump 2.0’s China policy – Competition without reassurances

In a November interview with China scholar Bonny Lin for a CSIS podcast after Trump’s victory, Kanapathy addressed potential differences between Trump and Biden’s objectives. “I am not sure the objectives are that different: our national strategy is to generate security and prosperity for the American people. A lot of things that Trump administration would pursue more aggressively, but not in a different direction, is to level the playing field in trade with the goal of bringing back US manufacturing and building up US exports. And you saw that articulated by the Biden administration also.”

Asked whether Trump 1.0’s Indo-Pacific strategic framework still held, Kanapathy credited Shinzo Abe’s conception of a “free and open” Indo-Pacific and Hillary Clinton’s pivot to Asia – which emphasised allies and partners while de-emphasising ties with China – as precursors to Trump’s approach.

“The Trump administration took that further and redefined it as a competitive relationship… I think there will be a lot of continuity. In general, there is an emphasis on burden-sharing which can only be done with strong alliances… to pressure your closest friends to do more for our collective security and invest more in it.”

On China’s increased assertiveness, he said, “I will agree that China has become more coercive and aggressive… but I don’t think China has become more powerful. As a percentage of global GDP, since the Trump administration, US has continued to climb and China has declined.” He added that US needed stronger leadership, saying that dialogue with China on issues from climate to AI had sent “confusing signals” to US citizens and government agencies. “China is the number one challenger and threat.”

Kanapathy indicated the Trump team will pursue “competition and deterrence” without offering assurances to China, which many Republicans saw as accommodation or appeasement. He drew parallels to Republican views that reassurances to Vladimir Putin or Iran had emboldened Moscow and Tehran.

He also pushed back against perceptions that Trump opposed allies: “What he sought was not to have free riders. Free riding is not a sign of a strong alliance either. Strong alliance is where everyone chips in and does their share.” While noting Trump’s elevation of the Quad and claiming AUKUS originated during his administration, Kanapathy expressed skepticism about arrangements like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.

The Taiwan reset

On Taiwan, in a piece for Brookings Institution in August 2024, Kanapathy argued, “To maintain peace, Washington must invest more in hard deterrence. It should also reconsider its messaging posture on ‘non-support’ for Taiwanese independence and how it refers to the collection of relevant US policies.”

He recommended that the US president make a clear case to Congress that China is “a threat to global stability” and that Taiwan “is a vital US interest”.

Kanapathy suggested abandoning explicit statements of non-support for Taiwan’s independence. “US officials should not gratuitously articulate non-support for Taiwanese independence… Officials could instead use the neutral formulation of opposing unilateral changes to the status quo.” He argued that emphasizing non-support for Taiwanese independence as a reassurance to China was “misguided and fruitless,” since Beijing did not distinguish between US support for Taiwan’s democracy and independence. Such messaging, he said, sent inaccurate signals to third countries and deflected from the “true threat to cross-strait peace: PRC aggression”.

Instead, Kanapathy advocated referring to the one-China Policy as cross-Straits policy. “This proposed US nomenclature change would make it easier to push back on the PRC’s misattributions and help unwind its narratives that isolate Taiwan from the international community, again potentially enhancing deterrence.”